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Felix S. Cohen has observed that
[a]n ethics, like a metaphysics, is no more certain and no
less dangerous because it is unconsciously held. There
are few judges, psychoanalysts, or economists today who
do not begin a consideration of their typical problems
with some formula designed to cause all moral ideals to
disappear and to produce an issue purified for the pro-
cedure of positive empirical science. But the ideals have
generally retired to hats from which later wonders will
magically arise.'
If the wonders of antitrust policy are the metaphysical constructs
of rules stating what the law isv and the ethical constructs of the
reasoning stating what it ought to be, the hats whence they arise
often remain obscure. The ideological values dictating the scope
and direction of antitrust analysis are hidden behind rubrics of
"per se" illegality,2 the refinements of elegant tests for market
analysis, 3 and the vagaries of "standing ' 4 or "causation" 5 re-
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General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
1 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Sherman, Antitrust Standing
From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374 (1976).
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quirements limiting the right of private plaintiffs to recovery.
The recent limitations imposed by the Burger Court upon anti-
trust enforcement in some areas6 and the Court's expansive
reading of the scope of the antitrust laws in others7 are manifes-
tations of a deeper and more complex process than the discovery
of new insights into the workings of old rules or a preference for
one mode of economic analysis over another. The underlying
ideological presuppositions of a majority of the Court have
changed, and recent decisions reflect change in these deep-
seated assumptions about the "is" and the "ought" of antitrust
policy and the Court's role in implementing that policy. The
manner in which these assumptions generate legal decisions de-
pends on those factors that precondition one's perceptions of
reality, interpretations of the meaning of legal concepts, trust in
the ability of language to carry the burden of articulating know-
able and acceptable rules, and faith in the legal process to ex-
press long term goals yet maintain flexibility. To probe this
ideological substratum affecting decisionmaking is the task not
only of the judge who would know himself, but also of the prac-
titioner who would understand the meaning and relevance of
existing doctrine, and of the scholar who would contribute to the
evolution of the law.
When the ideological complexion of lawmaking institutions
like the Supreme Court shifts over a relatively short time-span, a
re-examination of the ideals of antitrust policy is necessary
to understand the evolution of doctrine through the litigation
process. The heretofore predictable, even if fuzzy-about-the-
edges, doctrines of antitrust policy and the evolving direction of
antitrust principle become unsettled and difficult to predict.
Such a state of affairs is of concern to the practicing lawyer since
certainty and predictability, to the extent they do exist in the
world of antitrust, become even more obscure in a system of
changing values, different emphasis, and refined verbalizations
all hiding new ideological shifts.
The current change in direction by the Court is paralleled
by increasing ideological debate among the scholars of antitrust
policy. Traditionally, scholars trained in the art of legal analysis
6 See cases cited notes 3-5 supra.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
(1975).
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debated what antitrust policy is or ought to be within relatively
narrow boundaries. They parsed the inductive and deductive
logic of legal decisions, oblivious to sources of wisdom beyond
the four corners of what judges said in written opinions. The
insights of legal realism disturbed this tidy world of clipped
analysis and gentlemanly dispute, heavily laden with footnotes.
At its simplest level, legal realism suggested that one should be
aware of the ideological complexion of decisionmakers and
perhaps try to discover from what "side of the bed" they hap-
pened to arise on decision day. Yet, initially, admonitions that
the "pre-perceptive mass" of the decisionmaker be taken into
account, like forays into the empirical world, did not stray too
far from the path of defining and articulating a knowable body
of rules in force and tendencies in gestation. In time, however,
legal realism undermined the belief that law and legal decision-
making could be carried out pursuant to the positivist's closed
model of deductive logic by which application of abstract rule to
concrete facts inexorably produced the "correct" decision. If car-
ried to an extreme, however, the approach of the legal realists
also undermined the stability of doctrine and, in areas like anti-
trust, made rational predictability of lawful business structure,
acquistions, or behavior hazardous at best or, at worst, depen-
dent upon short-circuiting the enforcement process before litiga-
tion began. Perhaps in response to the open-ended and uncer-
tain evolution of antitrust policy during the era of the Warren
Court, there has been a renewed effort to bring greater certainty
and predictability to antitrust analysis by the rigorous employ-
ment of the seemingly objective and value free tool of statistical
analysis of quantifiable empirical evidence pursuant to models
designed to maximize "economic efficiency."
The quest for certainty has not been limited to courts
staffed by judges more sympathetic to the need for predict-
ability, narrower in their view of the function of courts, and
trusting in the ability of verbal rules to dictate outcome. Indeed,
the ideological shifts in the courts have followed the escalation of
debate and dissension among the scholars of antitrust. 8 In recent
' An early highlight of the growing dispute over the goals of antitrust policy was
the series of exchanges between Professors Blake and Jones of Columbia and Professors
Bork and Bowman of Yale. The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLU1,I. L.
REV. 363, 377, 401, 417, 422 (1965). See generally Austin, The Emergence of Societal Anti-
trust, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 903 (1972); Bernhard, Competition In Law' and Economics, 12
ANTITRUST BULL. 1099 (1967); Brodley, Massive Industrial Size, Classical Economics and The
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years the intensity of the scholarly debate has dramatically in-
creased as proponents of "economic analysis" of legal issues have
brought to bear the potentially powerful insights of their
methodology to "issues antitrust." Perhaps also in response to
the uncertainties created by legal realism, some have even gone
so far as to contend that the empirical evidence of the world
objectively quantifiable and measured against a value-free eco-
nomic model of "efficiency" should be the sole test for defining
antitrust policy, thereby freeing us at last from the heretofore
frustrating vagaries of antitrust enforcement policy, judicial de-
cisionmaking and legislative policy-making. All that is needed is
a collective bending at the knee by bench and bar before the
"science" of economics, and a recognition that once and for all
we have an objective tool that can lead us to truth, certainty and
an ideal world consistent with the hopes and aspirations of all.
With this development we come full circle. The realists discarded
the view of law as a seamless web and replaced it with an inquiry
into the psychology and ideology of the decisionmaker that was
sure to breed levels of uncertainty. Yet by rejecting the positivist
model the realists also exposed law to non-legal sources of au-
thority, and it is one of those sources, economics and its "objec-
tive" pursuit of efficiency, that is now proposed as a guide to
bring order out of chaos. To the extent that one believes this
ought to be so to the exclusion of other sources of knowledge,
and that it can be so given the frailties of the legal process, the
proponents of an exclusive reliance upon economic analyses to
resolve disputes in the legal process are reborn positivists. The
dictates of the inexorable and immutable truth of "economic
efficiency" when rigorously applied to quantified empirical evi-
dence can bring order out of chaos, harmonize policy with "real-
ity" and end wasteful regulation. The "right" decision is assured
through application of the model of efficiency to any given facts.
This position is not without its critics, not only because the
writings of some of its proponents often tend to be unintelligible
theoretical model building, but because there are those who be-
Search for Humanistic Value, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1155 (1972); Dewey, The Economic Theory
of Antitrust: Science or Religion?, 50 VA. L. REV. 413 (1964); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974). There have also been recent
congressional hearings on the topic. The Role of Small Business In Our Society Before the
Senate Select Comnm. on Small Business, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Symposium on the Eco-
nomic, Social and Political Effects of Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
& Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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lieve that economics is not a science, or at least not an objective
verifier of a knowable reality resulting in eternal truth. 9 Many
view economic analysis as a useful tool, one of several sources of
insight to be relied upon in framing policy, to be weighed along
with other sources of knowledge, value choices and intuition.'
Even those who may be willing to argue that economic analysis
of "efficiency" is itself value free may still claim that antitrust
policy is designed to achieve political and social goals as well and
that those goals should outweigh, in some cases, any claimed or
proven economic inefficiencies.11 Some believe this is so because
Congress intended the antitrust laws to serve goals broader than
the maximization of economic efficiency however defined or ap-
plied. Others may suggest that economic efficiency is unwisely
proffered as the sole objective of antitrust because the psy-
chological assumptions about human nature upon which the lais-
sezfaire model of economic analysis is constructed may be mis-
leading or incomplete. They only take account of the selfish and
Spencerian aspects of human nature rationally applied and fail to
consider or encourage the equally significant factors of human
motivation that may stem from irrational behavior, a lust for
power, or a praiseworthy sense of fraternity or altruism. 12 A
further objection to sole reliance upon economic efficiency as a
guide to policy, even if agreement could be had upon its defini-
tion and application, is that law is a human institution designed
to fulfill human aspirations as well as to curb human excesses.
Even if efficiency is expansively defined to encompass a maximi-
zation of social welfare in addition to a maximization of value of
I See Leff, supra note 8. Daniel Yankelovitch indicates how a thinking process that
places exclusive reliance on quantifiable data may blind one to "reality." Policy makers
measured success in the Viet Nam War by equating success with numbers of pacified
villages, "body counts," and tons of bombs dropped, a process Yankelovitch labeled the
"MacNamara Fallacy."
The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is okay
as far as it goes. The second step is to disregard that which can't be measured
or give it an arbitrary quantitative value. This is artifical or misleading. The
third step is to presume that what can't be measured easily really isn't very
important. This is blindness. The fourth step is to say that what can't be easily
measured really doesn't exist. This is suicide.
Smith, The Last Day of Cowboy Capitalism, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1972, at 43, 54
(quoting Daniel Yankelovitch).
'" See Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on PolicY, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
363, 377, 422.
1 See Bernhard, supra note 8.
IS See Brodley, supra note 8. For a current popular statement of this view, see
SCHUMACHER, SMALL is BEAUTIFUL: ECONoMIcs As IF PEOPLE MATTERED (1973).
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output, other equity concerns, such as curbing the arbitrary ex-
ercise of power will continue to elude the economics-obsessed
jurist. Many of the deep divisions among the scholars of antitrust
policy stem from divergent presuppositions, seldom unveiled for
critical examination, about these assumptions and ideals that
have been "generally retired to hats from which later wonders
will magically arise."
The significance of the debate far exceeds intellectual titilla-
tion for the inhabitants of the academy. The outcome of cases
frequently depends upon an attorney's facility in structuring the
evidence to prove or disprove "economic efficiency" within the
limitations of the verbal formulas of antitrust rules and the as-
sumptions, conscious and otherwise, of judge and jury about the
economic, political, and social goals of antitrust policy. Evidence
of motive or intent may not be admissible in the court of ajudge
convinced that the antitrust test for the legality of human con-
duct in the economic arena must be objectively weighed on the
scales of maximization of the value of total output.
On the other hand, in the courtroom of a judge pre-
occupied with equity and insensitive to long-term economic effi-
ciency, evidence of "evil purpose" may so overwhelm a judge or
jury that drastic remedies are employed in circumstances where
none is justified. A decision in a particular case tainted by evil
intent may create a precedent that is counter to the long-term
public goals of the antitrust laws.
At the appellate level, the ideological meaning of "economic
efficiency" and the balance to be struck between efficiency, how-
ever defined, and other goals of antitrust, however defined, un-
derlie many of the pressing issues in antitrust. For example, the
willingness of the Supreme Court to condemn as horizontal ter-
ritorial restraints the practices involved in United States v. Topco
Associates13 expressly rested upon the majority's preception of
broad political and social goals of antitrust:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sheman Act in par-
ticular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic free-
dom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights
is to the protection of our fundamental personal free-
doms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every
13 405 U.S. 596 (1962).
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business, no matter how small, is the freedom to com-
pete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion and
ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.
14
Beneath the metaphors one senses what Learned Hand de-
scribed as a preference for "a system of small producers, each
dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to
one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the
direction of a few."'' 5 So long as courts countenance such non-
economic goals, prediction of results in the world of antitrust will
be an art rather than a science, dependent upon a sophisticated
understanding of the limits, as well as the capacity, of formal
economic analysis, and the balance to be struck with other
sources of wisdom perhaps not subject to quantification. As in
constitutional adjudication, the Court is charged with giving ef-
fect to the long term value choices underlying the vague and
general language of the law, all the while respecting the effective
limits of the judicial process and balancing the need for a gener-
ous flexibility to accommodate new circumstances and certainty
to resolve present and pressing problems.
The implications of the unexamined assumptions of de-
cisionmakers in antitrust matters extend beyond influencing the
concious balancing of economic goals and political or social
goals. The perception of the facts relied upon to prove or dis-
prove an antitrust violation may differ greatly depending upon
the metaphysical and ethical assumptions one brings to bear on
the dispute. For example, the majority and dissenting opinions
in the deeply divided Ninth Circuit decision of GTE Sylvania, Inc.
v. Continental T.V., Inc. 6 reflect startlingly different perceptions
of what "in fact" transpired in the court below. The majority
interpreted the trial court's jury instructions as stating that verti-
cally imposed location clauses are per se unlawful.1 7 The dissent-
ingjudges, apparently reading the same instructions, interpreted
them as informing the jury that a contract, combination, or con-
spiracy with one or more dealers to enforce a location clause
agreement and resulting in a restraint on resale of the goods is
per se unlawful.' The differing interpretations of what tran-
11 Id. at 610.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
,6537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 252 (1976).
I7 d. at 988.
81 Id. at 1006 (Kilkennv, J., dissenting); Id. at 1018 (Browning, J., dissenting).
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spired at trial or, perhaps more accurately, the inclinations to
perceive what transpired at trial one way or the other, were
deeply influenced by the majority and dissenting judges' ideolog-
ical presumptions about the goals of antitrust policy. In GTE
Sylvania, the ideals were retrieved from Felix Cohen's "hats," and
sparked long opinions debating the "is" and the "ought" of anti-
trust policy. In the process, the debate not only served to de-
monstrate how such underlying ideological assumptions influ-
ence the choice of policy, but how ideological assumptions may
even dictate one's preception of the "reality" which gave rise to
the dispute.
The realist tradition suggests at least that the vague man-
date of the antitrust laws, leaving the court so much freedom to
chart directions and articulate rules, will engage many sources of
insight and will pursue a multiplicity of value choices. Certainty
will prevail where there is a consensus on the value choices ex-
pressed (horizontal price fixing); uncertainty will prevail where
there are conflicts between the values perceived and the wisdom
of the choices made (vertical market restraints). To consider
these directions, these sources, and these choices and clarify the
values involved, the Antitrust Law and Economics Section of the
American Association of Law Schools devoted its 1976 annual
meeting to a panel discussion of the topic: "The Social and Polit-
ical Goals of Antitrust-Other than Competitive Markets and
Economic Efficiency, What Else Counts?" The panel was com-
posed of distinguished scholars of antitrust, experienced in the
practice and teaching of antitrust policy from a variety of per-
spectives. Professor Kenneth Elzinga of the University of Vir-
ginia presented the view of an economist with a deep and long-
standing interest in antitrust enforcement; he has served as
Economic Advisor to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division. l9 Professor Lawrence Sullivan contrib-
uted the views of a law professor with many years of experience
in practice as a partner in a leading Boston law firm and in-
volvement in cases of current significance. 20 Professor Gray Dor-
sey presented a philosopher's perspective on the question that is
19 Professor Elzinga has written extensively on antitrust remedies and recently co-
authored a book on the subject. ELZINGA & BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY
IN LAW AND ECONOMIICS (1976).
2, Professor Sullivan is co-counsel for the plaintiff in GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Conti-
nental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 252 (1976). He is also
the author of Handbook of the Lau, of Antitnst (1977).
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seasoned with experience teaching antitrust and service as coun-
sel in significant antitrust litigation.21
In addition to the formal papers presented by the panelists
that are printed here, lively commentary was provided by Profes-
sor Joseph Brodley of Indiana University and Professor Michael
Levine of the University of Southern California. The authors of
the formal papers were delegated the tasks of bringing to bear
their expertise as economist, philosopher, and law professor and
their considerable practical antitrust experience to the proposi-
tions: (1) whether the goals of antitrust policy include social and
political values as well as economic ones; (2) if so, what are those
goals; (3) how can the political and social goals identified be
harmonized with economic efficiency; and (4) how can one trans-
late the resulting brew into workable and predictable legal stan-
dards. The insights provided by all the participants provoked a
lively discussion and a broader understanding of the ideological
underpinnings of antitrust policy. Whether one has a fixed belief
that economic analysis according to accepted models for mea-
suring economic efficiency is only the beginning of antitrust
analysis, the beginning and the end of it, or only a relevant
consideration along with political, social, and other values, it is
well for the reader to keep in mind one of Felix Cohen's other
trenchant observations:
Lawyers . ..have special opportunities to learn what
many logicians have not yet recognized: that truth on
earth is a matter of degree, and that, whatever may be
the case in Heaven, a terrestrial major league batting
average above .300 is nothing to be sneezed at.
22
21 Professor Dorsey represented the plaintiff in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968) and the plaintiff in Hiland Dairy v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969). Professor Dorsey also serves as President of the
International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. He is editor of
the Association's three volume work, Toward Equality and Freedom: An International and
Coiparative Approach, to be published this year.
21 Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 239 (1950).
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